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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
IN SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Comi No. 40353-2012 
District Court No. CV-11-662 
COMES NO\:V, Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz ("Schultz"), by and tlu-ough his 
attorneys of record, Fuller Law Offices, and hereby submits the following Brief in 
Suppmi of Petition for Review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' Decision filed in Wally 
Kay Schultz v. State of Idaho on December 30, 2013, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
118. 
Schultz alleges that the Idaho Comi of Appeals' Decision has decided a question 
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of substance not heretofore determined by the Supreme Comi, has decided a question 
probably not in accord with Supreme Court or 
of the United States Supreme Court, and has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
previous decision of the Co mi of Appeals. 
ARGUlVIENT 
On or about August 3, 2006, Appellant, Wally Kay Schultz, (hereinafter referred 
to as "Schultz"), \vas charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, as is set forth in 
Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, 111 and for the 
County of Minidoka. Said case \vas set for trial at a later date, \vhich \Vas vacated 
because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4, 2007. 
Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a unified sentence of five (5) 
years, which unified sentence was comprised of a minimum (fixed) period of confinement 
of five (5) years, followed by an indetem1inate penod of custody of 0 years. Schultz 
received credit for time served in the amount of 376 days. (R. pp. 11 124.) 
Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received 
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four 
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003, 
certain improprieties occuned in at least one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp. 
9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark 
Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab 
Improvement Manager, Matthew Garnette, regarding Skyler .Anderson. Garnette 
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of 
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controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of 
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing. 
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally 
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection 
of this practice. Mr. i\nderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four 
occasions. (R. p. 138.) 
Mr. Anderson's conduct \Vas succmctly stated by Colonel G. Jerry Russell, 
Director, Idaho State Po lice, in conespondence dated May 11, 2011, to William Lloyd 
Mauk. 
"Mr. .A.nderson was complicit over a period of years in deliberately hiding 
a box of "show and tell" drugs kept at the ISP Forensic Lab in Pocatello. I 
understand that this was part of the training he received from now forn1er 
Region 5 lab employees, Don Wyckoff and Rockland McDowell, who 
apparently justified to bim as the box being kept as "reference" materials 
that would cost money to order from supply companies. Mr. Anderson's 
direct participation in the activity concerning this box appears to have 
ended in 2008 when he was transfen-ed to toxicology, at which point he 
ceased having any direct connection to it. After reading an article that 
Region 5 Lab Manager Shaimon Larson sent to Mr. Anderson in 2011, and 
knowing that the existence of the unauthorized box could have a negative 
effect on the lab's accreditation, Mr. A.nderson reported the existence of 
the box to Ms. Larson. Until this disclosure to Ms. Larson, this box and 
its contents were kept secreted and hidden from auditors. Mr. Anderson 
himself hid this box and its contents on at least four occasions, ai1d he 
instructed at least one other lab employee to do the same. 
As set f01ih in the Notice of contemplated Disciplinary Action dated April 
27, 2011, there are very serious consequences of Mr. A.nderson's actions 
that I must consider. First, since he deliberately hid the box of "show and 
tell" drugs from lab auditors, numerous times and over a period of years, I 
have no choice but to view his actions as repeated purposeful deception. 
Second, Mr. Anderson's actions may have caused serious damage to 
Region 5 Lab's reputation, and may have even called into question the 
accuracy and integrity of the entire ISP Forensic Lab pro grain. Surely Mr. 
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Anderson appreciates the devastation to the Idaho criminal justice system 
should that happen. Third, .Mr. Anderson's actions could have an adverse 
effect on Region 5's lab accreditation. should be acutely aware of this, 
that is an Society of Cnme Laboratory 
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board) auditor. 
(Please see Exhibit "B".) 
Schultz filed a Petition, Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and Motion and 
Affidavit in Support of Appointment of Counsel, on or about the day of August 2011, 
alleging, among other things, that there existed ne\\·ly discovered evidence that would 
justify post conviction relief in this matter. ( R. p. 1-25.) 
A hearing was conducted on or about June 25, 2012, relative to all pending 
motions, and Exhibit A and Office of Professional Standards Administrative Investigation 
Packet as Exhibit B \Vere introduced as evidence. (R. pp 191-192.) 
That the Court issued an Order Regarding All Pending Motions and Judgment of 
Dismissal on or about the l l 1h day of July, 2012. (R. pp. 194-204.) On or about July 25, 
2012, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 205-213.) The State filed an 
Objection to Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 7, 2012. (R. pp. 214-216,) 
On or about the lOll' day of August, 2012, the Court entered an Order Denying the 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 217-224.) 
Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal on or about the 20th day of September, 2012. (R. 
pp. .) The Idaho Supreme Comi issued an Order Remanding to District Court on 
or about the 24t1i day of September, 2012. (R. p. 228.) The Comi issued a Judgment on 
or about the 28 111 day of September, 2012. (R. p. 229.) Schultz then filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal on or about October 5, 2012. (R. pp. 230-233.) Schultz appeal was 
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denied on December 30, 2013. 
In the Court of Appeals' Decision Court notes primarily that: 
1. Schultz acknowledged that the u11disclosed mfon11ation \Vas impeachment 
evidence, and: 
2. Pursuant to Ruiz, the State had no obligation to disclose the infomrntion 
before Schultz pled guilty, and; 
3. Schultz relies on Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio, 
the United States Supreme Court held that failure to disclose impeaclm1ent 
evidence is a potential source of a BracZv violation in a trial setting. 
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54. However, Giglio 's application is limited by the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Ruiz. There the Court specifically 
considered exculpatory impeachment evidence, which Schultz attempts to 
rely on: 
The constitutional question concerns a federal criminal 
defendant's \Vaiver of the right to receive from prosecutors 
exculpatory impeachment material--a right that the 
Constitution provides as part of its basic "fair trial" 
guarantee .... Giglio v. States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 
92 S. Ct. 763, 31L.Ed.2d104 (1972) (exculpatory 
evidence includes "evidence affecting" witness 
"credibility," \vhere the witness' "reliability" is likely 
"determinative of guilt or mnocence"). 
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628 . 
The Court then distinguished the constitutional guarantee to 
receive impeachment evidence at trial from receiving it before 
pleading guilty and held that the State does not have the same 
obligation to disclose where a defendant pleads guilty. Id. at 
628-33. Characterizing the undisclosed evidence as exculpatory 
impeachment evidence does not bring Schultz outside the 
parameters of Ruiz. The Constitution simply does not require tbe 
goverm11ent to disclose "material impeachment evidence" prior to 
entering a plea agreement with a cnminal defendant. id. at 633. 
The District Comi in its Order stated that "impeachment evidence "is special in 
relation to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is " Dun lap v. 
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State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376, (2004) (quoting v. Ruiz, 536 
.S. 
state 
629 (2002 )) (emphasis in original). It noted that goes on to 
"[i]mpeachment evidence should be vievved in the same manner as 
exculpatory evidence." Id, citing United Swtes v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985); Pizzuto v. State, 
134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3d 742, 745 (2000). 
As the District Court has previously noted, '· ... the United States 
Constitution does not require the State to disclose material impeachment 
infomrntion prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant. United 
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153 
LEd.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002)." 
Hov,rever, in State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, P.2d 1144 (App. 1994), the 
Court stated as follows: 
The State also contends that a defendant is entitled to asse1i a Brady 
violation only if the defendant's conviction followed a trial and not if the 
defendant pleaded guilty. This argument is misplaced, for this Court has 
previously held that grounds for withdrawal of a guilty pl ea were shown 
where material, exculpatory evidence known to the State had been 
withheld from the defendant. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 816 P.2d 
364 (Ct.App. 1991).[fn6] Although the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions have articulated the prosecutor's disclosure obligation as one 
essential to ensure a fair trial, Brady, 3 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. at J 196-
1197; Agurs, 427 D.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400, the underlying policy 
expressed by these opinions to uncover truth and ensure that only the 
guilty are convicted applies as well where a guilty plea was entered in 
ignorance of material, exculpatory information possessed by the 
prosecution. In Bagley, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of 
the Brady rule is "to ensure that a miscaJTiage of justice does not occur," 
Bagley, 473 FS. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-3380, and in Agurs, the Com1 
stated: 
[T]hough the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the 
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accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be 
faithful to his client's interest that "justice shall 
be done." He is the "servant of the , the t\vofold aim of 
lS or innocence suffer." 
427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at 2401, quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). As to the 
risk of conviction of the innocent by guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has 
stated, "This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the 
court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against 
unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by 
plea or by trial." Brady v. Unired States, 397 U.S. 758, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 
1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).[fn7] In light of these pronouncements of the 
Supreme Com1, we see no reason to depart from our decision in Johnson, 
w"bich allows relief for violations of the prosecutorial obligation of 
disclosure in appropriate circumstances where the conviction was entered 
upon a guilty plea. 
The validity of a guilty plea is deten11ined by reference to whether it \Vas 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 .S. 8, 89 
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Brady v. 397 U.S. at 
748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468-1469; Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 398, P.2d at 
State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 558, 835 P.2d 1366, 1369. This entails an 
inquiry as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that 
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront adverse witnesses and to refrain from self-incrimination; and 
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284. Thus, to satisfy 
constitutional standards, a guilty plea must not only be voluntary but must 
be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 
1469. It also must not be a product of "misrepresentation or other 
impem1issible conduct by state agents." Id., 397 US. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at 
1473. \Vhere misconduct by the state keeps a defendant and his attorney 
unaware of circumstances tending to negate the defendant's guilt or to 
reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of those facts may 
not be knowing and intelligent though it is othen:vise voluntary. 
Accordingly, a Brady v. lvfmyland violation may wainnt setting aside a 
guilty plea where the violation calls into question the accuracy of the 
adjudication of guilt. 
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In the vast majority of cases, 1vhen defendants plead guihy they know full 
well whether they in fact committed offense. If information withheld 
by the State relates to a fact that was within the defendant's lmmvledge and 
was the discovery of a BracZv 
violation ought not enable the defendant to contest that which he has 
already openly admitted. In such circumstances, a violation of the 
prosecution's obligation of disclosure does not compromise the truth or 
risk conviction of the innocent. Therefore. it is essential to determine 
\Vhether the defendant's admissions at the plea hearing fully established his 
factual guilt. 
The inquiry into the effect of the undisclosed evidence on the plea decision 
as discussed in White is essentially the same as an assessment of the 
materiality of the evidence. The Brady principle is violated only if the 
evidence withheld by the state is both exculpatory and material. Bagley, 
473 .S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); 427 .S. at 
107-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2402; Brady, 373 .S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-
1197. "Materiality" for purposes of evaluating a claimed Brady violation is 
defined in Bagley: 
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable 
probability" is a probability sufficient to undern1ine confidence in 
the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 
On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but the state's failure to produce 
the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead 
would have msisted on going to trial.[fn9] v. , 848 F.2d 
1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation into \Vhat 
the particular defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but 
an objective assessment, based in part upon the persuasiveness of the 
\Vithheld information. Id. See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106 
S.Ct. at 370-371. 
Schultz would invoke the doctrine set fo1ih m Gardner and Dunlap and ask the 
Court to determine wbether or not there is a reasonable probability, but for the State's 
failure to produce the information, Schultz would not have entered the plea but instead 
would have insisted on going to trial. This is an objective assessment, based in part upon 
the part of the persuasiveness of the withheld information. At oral argument before the 
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Court of both counsei asserted that the objective assessment set forth above was 
to be the ultimate decision presented to and 
not even reference Gardener. 
In United v. Ruiz, 536 l!.S. 622 (2002), the Court stated as follo\\S: 
\iVhen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair 
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 .S. 
238, 243 (1969) (pleading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self--
incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the Sixth 
Amendment right to tnal by jury). Given the seriousness of the matter, the Constitution 
insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is "voluntary" and 
that the defendant must make related \:\'aivers "knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with 
sufficient mvareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'' v. 
United States, 397 l!.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin, supra, at 242. 
Schultz would assert that his plea of guilt was not knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent given the persuasiveness of the withheld infomrntion. \\There misconduct by 
the State keeps a defendant and his attorney una\vare of circumstances tending to negate 
tbe defendant's guilt or to reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of 
those facts may not be lmowmg and intelligent, though it is otberwise voluntary. 
Therefore, a Brac(v violation may wanant setting aside a guilty plea where the violation 
calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt. Gardner at 434. 
Further, Schultz specifically requests that this Court find that the evidence 
introduced is exculpatory evidence. In Giglio, the Corni held that "exculpatory evidence 
includes "evidence affecting" \Vitness "credibility," where the \Vitness' "reliability" is 
likely "detem1inative of guilt or innocence"". Giglio v. United States, 405 .S. 150, 92 
S.Ct 763 (1972) 
Schultz contends that the evidence presented to the District Court is, in fact, 
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impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. As set forth above, exculpatory 
evidence includes impeachment evidence where the witness' reliability is likely 
deten11inative of guilt or innocence. Obviously, in any possession of controlled 
substances case, the forensic scientist' testimony detern1ine guilt or i1mocence. 
Hypothetically speaking, upon an examination of the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, a 
defendant could meet every single element contained in those instructions for the charge 
of possession of controlled substances, with the exception of the determination that the 
substance was, in fact, a controlled substance, and not be guilty of the charge. It is not 
sufficient to sustain a c01w1ction for possession of a controlled substance where the 
substance is not, in fact, a controlled substance. The only witness that can satisfy this 
requirement is a forensic scientist, duly qualified, who can reliably report test results. 
There can be no other way. Therefore, witness' is or 
innocence. 
to 
In addition, the evidence is exculpatory for several other reasons. First, according 
v. A1errell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), the 
testing procedures utilized in a criminal proceeding should be in a form that is commonly 
accepted in the scientific community. As the Court is likely aware, analysis of controlled 
substances utilizes the Scientific Method. The Scientific Method requires a "controlled" 
environment. The evidence submitted at hearing clearly shows that a large quantity of 
controlled substances which had been unaccounted was being stored in the roof tiles of 
the laboratory. Given that there were no rules or regulations pertaining to the storage of 
those drugs, nor their handling, it is entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory 
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l'ias contaminated by the unaccounted for controlled substances. Further, the evidence 
demonstrates that there were no set the amount 
substance \vhich was to be taken from each substance for testing purposes, there \\'ere no 
rules or regulations concerning the destruction of samples, nor 1vere the forensic analysts 
being audited concerning their policies and procedures relating to the of 
controlled substances. It is apparent that there vvas not a controlled environment existing 
at the time Schultz' drug sample 1vas tested. The evidence introduced at hearing clearly 
demonstrates that said evidence is both impeaching and exculpatory. 
CO~CLUSION 
Schultz vvould request that the Court make a detern1ination as to whether or not 
the test set forth in Gardner should have been utilized, i.e. '·on a Brady challenge to a 
guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether there is a reasonable probability but for 
the state's failure to produce the information, the defendant vvould not have entered 
plea but instead would have msisted on going to trial. 1vfiller v. , 848 F.2d 1312, 
(2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation into vvhat the particular 
defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but an objective assessment, 
based in part upon the persuasiveness of the withheld infom1ation. Id. See Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. at 370-371." 
It is difficult to imagine that had Schultz knovm of findings made by the 
Idaho State Police, that he would have entered a plea of guilty. Schultz contends that an 
objective person would not have entered a plea of guilty, and would have instead taken 
the matter to a trial before a jury of his peers. 
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Therefore, Schultz requests that the Idaho Supreme Court review the decision 
issued in this matter and further requests that his plea of \Vithdrawn set 
aside and the conviction vacated. 
DATED This 3 day of January, 2014. 
LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Appellant 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 
tv;o true and correct copies of the foregoing document to 
postage pre-paid, to the follovving: 
Lawrence Vv asden 
Idaho Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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